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Abstract
This paper reveals the characteristics of the ITC’s decisions on countervailing
duties, which have seldom been studied. The empirical evidences based on time
series data show that there is a long run equilibrium relationship between affir-
mative countervailing decisions and macroeconomic variables such as economic
growth rates and import penetration ratios. The error correction models show
that there is a unidirectional causality from affirmative countervailing decisions to
slower economic growth.
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2I. Introduction
Authorities of the importing countries may impose countervailing duties on imported
products which were subsidized by the government of the exporting country. Advocates of
countervailing duties argue that they are levied to level the playing field in international trade,
although their opponents suggest that they may be contrary to the consumers' interests in the
importing country.  To prevent excessive use of countervailing duties, it is necessary to have trade
regulations governing subsidies and countervailing measures in the global trading system, which are
found in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures as well as the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
This paper reveals the characteristics of the United States' countervailing duties,
considering that it has been the world's heaviest user of the countervailing duties.  Despite the
theoretical and institutional differences between antidumping and countervailing duties, most
international economists working on empirical aspects of trade remedy measures have focused on the
former and have seldom distinguished the characteristics of these from those of the latter, which are
summarized in Blonigen and Prusa (2001).  Baldwin and Steagall (1994), who can be regarded as an
exception in the literature, compared the antidumping duties with countervailing duties.  However,
they did not think of the possibility of spurious regression arising from use of non-stationary data.
Nor did they consider the relationship between countervailing duties and macroeconomic situation,
either.  This paper examines whether macroeconomic variables have long run equilibrium
relationships with the U.S. International Trade Commission's (ITC's) countervailing decisions and
reveals causal relationships between those variables by the error correction model.
The structure of the paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, the countervailing
decision making process in the United States is explained.  Section III presents the models used to
analyze the stationary properties, the cointegration nature and the causal relationships between the
concerned variables.  In section IV, the practices of countervailing duties, data and empirical
evidences following from the models are provided.  The final section summarizes the overall results.
3II. Institutional Background
Although most economists do not refute the superiority of free trade over protection in
improving national welfare, policy makers in most countries have actively practised some policy
measures to protect the domestic industries.  Considering the impact of subsidies in the sense of
injury to the domestic industry of importing country, they have been regulated by the current global
trading system.  The GATT has allowed imposition of the countervailing duties to counteract
subsidies.  GATT Article VI.3 defines the countervailing duty as "a special duty levied for the
purpose of offsetting any bounty or subsidy bestowed, directly, or indirectly, upon the manufacture,
production or export of any merchandise."  It also stipulates that "no countervailing duty shall be in
excess of an amount equal to the estimated bounty or subsidy."  The GATT Article VI.6 stipulates
the basic conditions for imposition of countervailing duties in the sense that it cannot be levied if it
does not "cause or threaten material injury to an established domestic industry, or is such as to
retard materially the establishment of a domestic industry."
The new Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, SCM Agreement
hereafter, as a result of the Uruguay Round modified the prior Tokyo Round Subsidies Code in
several important aspects.  Although the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code dealt with unilateral
responses to subsidies, there was no clear definition of a countervailable subsidy.  Because of the
Code's silence on this issue, countries were given a great deal of latitude in defining 'subsidy' for
countervailing duty purposes (Trebilcock and Howse (1995)).   The Subsidies Code tried to provide
some measure of substantive regulation in a field which is at the heart of the industrial policy debate
(domestically) and that of the unfair trade one (internationally) (Zampetti (1995)).
There is no precise definition of 'material injury' in the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code nor in
the Uruguay Round SCM Agreement.  Meanwhile, in determining material injury, Article 15.4 of the
Uruguay Round SCM Agreement specifies that the examination of the impact of the subsidized
imports on the domestic industry should include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and
indices having a bearing on the state of the industry.  Since there is yet no definition of material
injury in the Agreement, its interpretation can still be done arbitrarily.  Regarding the causal
4linkage, there is no precise definition of causation in the Uruguay Round SCM Agreement, either.
The United States has led the above-described evolution of the subsidies-related regulations
in the multilateral trading system.  In the United States, laws dealing with unfair foreign
subsidization date back to the Tariff Act of 1897.  However, the use of the U.S. countervailing duties
did not become widespread until it was revised in the Trade Act of 1974.  The most important change
was to make automatic the private right of action in seeking countervail redress.  This, in turn, led to
a dramatic increase in the number of countervail cases in the United States, and hence escalated
international concern (Collins-Williams and Salembier (1996)).  The current law regarding the
countervailing duties is found in the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, which is an amendment of the
Tariff Act of 1930.
Decisions relating to countervailing duties in the United States involve several steps.  When
the Department of Commerce (DOC) receives a complaint of foreign subsidies, the International
Trade Administration of the DOC evaluates whether subsidies have been granted.  The ITC must
then determine whether or not the complainant industry is either materially injured or threatened
with material injury as a result of the subsidized goods.  Both agencies must make preliminary and
final determinations.  If the ITC's preliminary determination is negative, the investigation is to be
terminated.  If it is affirmative, the DOC should finish a preliminary and final determination of
subsidies.  In a case where the DOC has made an affirmative final determination, the ITC is required
to make a final determination of injury.  If both the DOC's and the ITC's decisions were affirmative,
then a countervailing duties order is issued.  According to Marvel and Ray (1995), the injury test is
more important than the subsidy test in the sense that the DOC determined that countervailable
subsidies were present in most cases.
The ITC's decisions on material injury can be made quite subjectively.  Section 771 of
Title VII defines material injury as harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant.
It also illustrates the factors that the Commission shall consider, which comprise all relevant
economic factors which are likely to have a bearing on the state of the industry in the United States.
All of the illustrated injury factors are those restricted to the concerned domestic industry, which do
not reflect the overall macroeconomic conditions.
5Aware of the potential for lobbying, the Congress designed the ITC to remain insulated
from outside pressure.  The six Commissioners of the ITC are appointed by the President, approved
by the Senate and serve a nonrenewable 9-year term.  No more than three Commissioners may be
members of a single political party.  The voting process relating to countervailing duties is the same
as that relating to antidumping duties.  A negative ITC decision occurs only when a majority of the
ITC Commissioners votes that the imports have not caused material injury.
Until 1979, the United States interpreted injury as one exceeding 'de minimis injury'
(Folsom and Gordon (1995)).  The material injury condition was added in the 1979 Antidumping Act
as a consequence of the Tokyo Round.  In 1979, the House Ways and Means Committee and the
Senate Finance Committee opined that the causality condition in the case of imposing countervailing
duties is less strict than that required for safeguard measures.  In consequence, as from 1980, it was
more likely that the number of imposition of countervailing duties and the probability of affirmative
injury decisions would be higher (Schoenbaum (1987)).
The current U.S. countervailing duty law is subject to the Uruguay Round SCM
Agreement.  Some procedural changes such as filing the countervailing duties petitions were made
and the sunset review provision was included in the 1994 Uruguay Round Agreements Act.
However, little changes were introduced with respect to injury and causation.
III. The Models
Many provisions of the Subsidies Code in the GATT/WTO have been too vague.  The injury
determination procedure may be interpreted in different ways.  In the United States, the ITC's injury
determination in countervailing duties cases can be made by subjective judgment.  The
Commissioners' decisions can be related with the macroeconomic situation as well, since the
Commissioners' decisions are likely to affect their job prospects, particularly if one hopes to be
appointed to another federal position requiring the nomination of the President.  Given the
President's views towards the situation of the macroeconomy in tandem with those towards
protecting against injurious imports, the Commissioners may be tempted to find that deciding in a
6protectionist direction facing deterioration in the economic situation is helpful in gaining a federal
position in the future (Baldwin and Steagall (1994)).
Regarding the empirical examination of administered protection measures, authors such as
Finger, Hall and Nelson (1982), Herander and Schwartz (1984), Moore (1992), Baldwin and Steagall
(1994), Hansen and Prusa (1996), Mah (2000a), and Lee and Mah (2003), among others, used
regression analysis to examine the effects of domestic as well as international economic variables on
the Commissioners' antidumping decisions.  Leidy (1997) used first-differenced data to avoid
problems arising from use of non-stationary data.  Mah (2000b) revealed the cointegrating vector
regarding antidumping duties and macroeconomic variables.  However, none of those works except
for Baldwin and Steagall (1994) revealed the determinants of countervailing duties, despite the
difference between antidumping and countervailing duties.   Since Baldwin and Steagall (1994) did
not consider the possibility of spurious regression arising from use of non-stationary time series data,
this paper tries to reveal the relationship between countervailing decisions and macroeconomic
variables in the United States.  Specifically, the Commissioners' countervailing decisions are assumed
to be related with the macroeconomic situation of the overall economy such as import penetration
ratio as the international economic factor and real GDP growth rates as the domestic economic
factor.  That is, their affirmative countervailing decisions might have long run equilibrium
relationships with macroeconomic variables.
Since regression analyses using non-stationary variables may lead to spurious regression, it
is necessary to check the stationarity of the concerned variables.  The variables under consideration
include the percentage of the Commissioners' final affirmative decisions or votes with respect to
countervailing petitions in each year as well as import penetration ratios and real GDP growth rates.
The variables appearing in this paper denote the following: AD = the ratio of final affirmative
decisions divided by total final decisions; AV = the ratio of final affirmative votes (= the number of
affirmative votes divided by that of all votes); IP = import penetration ratio; and GY = real GDP
growth rate.  The data set covers annually observed data for the period 1980 - 1999.  This paper
starts from testing the stationarity applied to these variables. Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests are
performed with respect to these variables.  Data for IP and GY are constructed from IMF,
7International Financial Statisitics Yearbook, and data for AD and AV are observed from the Annual
Reports of the U.S. International Trade Commission, 1980 - 1999.
 In a case where the concerned variables are integrated of the same order, it is necessary to
check whether there exist(s) long run equilibrium relationship(s) between the concerned variables,
using cointegration tests.  If there exist(s) at least a cointegrating vector between the concerned
variables, we can conclude that there are long run equilibrium relationship(s) between these
variables even if they are non-stationary.  This paper uses Johansen's (1988, 1991) method to reveal
the cointegrating relationship and to provide the cointegrating vectors.  The cointegrating
relationship between the countervailing decisions and macroeconomic variables can be shown in the
following manner:
f(AD (or AV), IP, GY) = 0                                                                         (1)
Engle and Granger's (1987) Representation Theorem says that there exists an error
correction model if the concerned variables are cointegrated.  The error correction model regards
the differenced dependent variable as a function of the error correction term as well as the
differenced explanatory variables.  It can reveal the causal relationships between concerned
variables.  In a case where there exist cointegrating relationships between the concerned variables,
generally used Granger or Sims causality tests are not useful for testing the causal relationships.
Although the existence of the cointegrating relationship can tell us that of the causal relationship, it
cannot tell anything about the direction of the causality.  Meanwhile, the error correction model can
tell us this.  By using the error correction model, we can check the problems of two-way causality.
For instance, the ITC's affirmative countervailing decisions may increase with slowdown in the
economic growth rate.  On the other hand, it is also possible that its countervailing decisions may
harm the performance of the economy by distorting the resource allocational mechanism.
We can form the error correction models in the following manner:
(1-L)xt = a1 + b1z1t-1 + A(L)(1-L)xt + B(L)(1-L)yt + e1t                                                   (2)
(1-L)yt = a2 + b2z2t-1 + C(L)(1-L)yt + D(L)(1-L)xt + e2t                                                   (3)
where L denotes the lag operator.  The variables e1t and e2t are assumed to be the disturbance terms
with white noise properties.  The error correction terms in equations (2) and (3), z1 and z2, denote
8those arising from regressing x on y, and y on x, respectively.
Granger (1988) showed that one of the methods for testing the causal direction is to
examine the statistical significance of the error correction term.  Where there exists a cointegrating
relationship between two variables, at least one of the error correction terms should be statistically
significant.  If b1 is statistically significant, the causal relationship runs from y to x, and if b2 is
significant, it runs from x to y.
IV. Empirical Evidences
Unlike antidumping actions, the United States was the only main user of the countervailing
duties.  For instance, between 1979 and 1988 the United States initiated 371 actions while all other
countries initiated only 58 (Trebilcock and Howse (1995)).  That is, the United States alone shared 86
percent of initiation of countervailing duties in the concerned period.  Although the share of the other
countries initiating countervailing duties increased recently, the United States has been by far the
leader in initiating them.  For instance, the United States alone has shared about 40 percent of
initiation of countervailing duties since 1995.
Countervailing duties cases, once filed, have proven more difficult to carry to imposition of
duties than have antidumping petitions.  For the period 1980-1999, as is shown in Table 1, less than
73 percent of countervailing duty petitions resulted in successful preliminary U.S. ITC
determinations, compared with 81 percent in case of antidumping cases.  Such a difference is more
conspicuous in case of final decisions and the Commissioners in the ITC tend to consider more
cautiously in case of final decisions.  That is, during the same period, some 47 percent of
countervailing duties petitions resulted in final affirmative injury decisions, compared with 63
percent in the case of antidumping duties.
[Insert Table 1]
When the ratios of the U.S. ITC Commissioners' affirmative votes out of total votes are
9compared, during 1980 - 1999 the ratio of affirmative votes in case of countervailing duties is six to
twelve percent lower than that in the case of antidumping duties, as is shown in Table 2.  These
evidences are plausible in the sense that, since countervailing duties relate to governmental subsidies,
the Commissioners tend to consider diplomatically unlike antidumping duties which deal with the
private firms' practices.
[Insert Table 2]
To reveal the determinants of the Commissioners' decisions on countervailing duties, it is
necessary to examine the statistical properties of the concerned variables.  Among others, the
augmented Dickey-Fuller test is used to examine how stationary the series are.  The unit root test
results show that the levels of the concerned variables are in general not stationary.  Therefore, I
examine whether the first differenced forms of the concerned variables are stationary or not.  Table 3
shows that it is not unrealistic to assume that the variables GY, IP, AD, and AV are integrated of
order one.
[Insert Table 3]
The existence of long run equilibrium relationships among the concerned variables is
checked by Johansen cointegration procedure.  Regarding the long run equilibrium relationship
between AD and macroeconomic variables, Table 4 demonstrates that there exists at least a
cointegrating vector between AD and GY, although such a vector does not exist between AD and IP
at 5 percent level of significance.  Therefore, for AD and GY there surely exist error correction
models like equations (2) and (3) that capture the dynamic adjustment process.
[Insert Table 4]
Based on the data for the Commissioners' votes, Table 5 reconfirms the long run
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relationship between the ITC's countervailing decisions and macroeconomic variables.  According to
the results, there exists at least a cointegrating vector between AV and GY, although such a vector
does not exist between AV and IP at 5 perent level of significance.  Summarizing the evidences in
Tables 4 and 5, we can be sure that there exists a cointegrating vector between the ratio of
affirmative countervailing decisions or votes and real GDP growth rate.  According to the coefficient
of GY in the cointegrating vector, there appears to be a negative relationship between GY and the
final affirmative decisions or votes on countervailing duties.
[Insert Table 5]
The results of the error correction models following from the cointegrating equations are
shown in Table 6.  They show that there exist bi-directional causal relationships between GY and AD
at 5 percent level of significance.  Regarding the causal relationship between GY and AV, there exists
a unidirectional relationship running from AV to GY at 1 percent level of significance.  That is,
regardless of the measures of countervailing duties, increase in the ratio of affirmative countervailing
decisions tends to slow down the economic growth rate in the United States, even if such trade
remedy measures may protect the domestic industry for a while.  For the causal relationship from
GY to AV, the evidence is not so clear.  That is, we cannot be sure that countervailing decisions or
votes are caused by the economic growth rate.
[Insert Table 6]
As Blonigen and Prusa (2001) summarized, most of the previous literature on antidumping
duties showed that the antidumping decisions were influenced by macroeconomic conditions; for
instance, Moore (1992), Leidy (1997), Mah (2000a, 2000b), Lee and Mah (2003)).  Unlike those, the
current study on countervailing duties show that there is no significant evidence that the ITC
Commissioners' decisions on countervailing duties are influenced by macroeconomic variables.  They
would be more concerned about the situation of the concerned industry.  Meanwhile, where
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affirmative countervailing decisions are made, imposition of such additional duties increases the cost
of the intermediate products, which is plausible in the sense that, as Marvel and Ray (1995)
explained, countervailing duties tend to be applied to intermediate goods rather than finished goods.
Consequently, they tend to reduce the production and sales of the final products, resulting in the
slower economic growth rates. 
V. Conclusion
Most of the previous literature on the ITC's decisions on trade remedies against the
exporters' unfair practices overlooked the differences between antidumping and countervailing
duties and most international economists have focused on antidumping duties in dealing with such
trade remedies.  Since the United States has led the imposition of countervailing duties, this paper
reveals the characteristics of the ITC's decisions on countervailing duties.
The empirical evidences in this paper show that the variables relating to its countervailing
decisions are not stationary.  Johansen's cointegration test shows that there is a long run equilibrium
relationship between the percentage of affirmative countervailing decisions (or votes) and economic
growth rates; however, such a relationship is not found between the former and import penetration
ratios, which is different from the results in the literature on antidumping duties.  The error
correction models show that there is a unidirectional causality from affirmative countervailing
decisions to slower economic growth.  That is, imposition of countervailing duties increases the prices
of imported intermediate products and tends to reduce the production and sales of the domestic final
products, which slows down economic growth.  Although imposition of countervailing duties may
protect the concerned domestic industry producing the same or like products for a while, it would
distort the resource allocational mechanism, resulting in the less efficient functioning of the overall
economy.
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Table 1.  The Ratio of the U.S. ITC's Affirmative Decisions
  /Total Decisions, 1980-1999
Source: U.S. ITC, Annual Report, 1980-1999
  Cases Preliminary
Decisions
Final
Decisions
  Antidumping
  Duties
613/758
(80.9%)
307/490
(62.7%)
  Countervailing
  Duties
208/287
(72.5%)
100/215
(46.5%)
15
Table 2.  The Ratio of the Commissioners' Affirmative Votes/Total Votes
, 1980-1999
Source: U.S. ITC, Annual Report, 1980-1999
  Cases Preliminary
Votes
Final
Votes
  Antidumping
  Duties
2,980/3,739
(79.7%)
1,578/3,063
(51.5%)
  Countervailing
  Duties
1,045/1,418
(73.7%)
392/980
(40.0%)
16
Table 3.  Unit Root Test Results on the Variables Relating to Countervailing
Duties - Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests
Notes: * (**) denotes statistical significance at 5 (1) % level of significance.
Optimal lags in case of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests are chosen
by Schwarz selection criterion.
Table 4.  Johansen's Cointegration Test Applied to the U.S. ITC's Final Countervailing Decisions
Variables      level form
  first differenced
  form
real GDP growth
rates (GY)       -3.098
*     -4.696**
import penetration
ratio (IP)       -0.073     -2.900
ratio of final affirmative
decisions/total decisions
(AD)
      -1.815     -6.915**
ratio of final affirmative
votes/total votes (AV)       -2.301     -7.257
**
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______________________________________________________________________________
Null hypothesis: Likelihood  Estimated cointegrating vectors                     Log
r = number of co-           ratio statistic   AD         cons- GY     IP                        likeli-
integrating vectors                                  tant                         hood
______________________________________________________________________________
r = 0 15.510*  -47.176
r =< 1  6.047*  
               1.0 3.630 -1.174
(2.507)
r = 0 12.393  78.929
r =< 1  0.105
 1.0 1.508  -10.493
 (7.376)
______________________________________________________________________________
Notes: * (**) denotes statistical significance at 5 (1) % level of significance.  Values within
the brackets under the calculated cointegrating vectors denote the standard errors.
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Table 5.  Johansen's Cointegration Test Applied to the U.S. ITC Commissioners' Final
 Votes Relating to Countervailing Duties
______________________________________________________________________________
Null hypothesis: Likelihood      Estimated cointegrating vectors                  Log
r = number of co-           ratio statistic   AV cons-   GY      IP                  likeli-
integrating vectors tant              hood
______________________________________________________________________________
r = 0 20.584**  -40.749
r =< 1  9.153**  
               1.0 1.109 -0.239
(0.179)
r = 0 14.186  85.206
r =< 1  0.027
 1.0 0.760    -3.055
  (4.230)
______________________________________________________________________________
Notes: * (**) denotes statistical significance at 5 (1) % level of significance.  Values within
the brackets under the calculated cointegrating vectors denote the standard errors.
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Table 6.  Results from the Error Correction Models
_________________________________________________________________________________
dADt = 0.033 + 0.272*ECt-1 - 1.038dADt-1 - 0.650dADt-2 - 0.037dGYt-1 + 0.022dGYt-2
      (0.504) (2.683)     (-4.903)     (-3.319)     (-1.223)       (0.743)
dGYt = 0.120 - 1.316**ECt-1 + 0.355dGYt-1 + 0.335dGYt-2 - 2.345dADt-1 - 2.120dADt-2
      (0.317) (-4.385)     (1.518)       (1.556)      (-1.931)     (-1.805)
dAVt = 0.195 + 0.003ECt-1 - 0.954dAVt-1 - 0.626dAVt-2 - 0.049dGYt-1 - 0.013dGYt-2
      (1.925) (1.280)    (-4.630)      (-3.619)     (-1.908)     (-0.426)
dGYt = 0.157 - 1.349**ECt-1 + 0.371dGYt-1 + 0.287dGYt-2 - 3.589dAVt-1 - 1.967dAVt-2
      (0.432) (-4.585)     (1.628)       (1.358)      (-2.303)    (-1.284)
________________________________________________________________________________
Notes: The superscripts *(**) appearing right after the estimated coefficient of the error
correction term (= EC) denote statistical significance at 5 (1) % level of significance.
Values within the brackets under the estimated coefficients indicate the calculated
t statistics.  The notation d appearing in front of other variables denotes the first
differenced form of the concerned variables.
